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FORWARD
This report is submitted in compliance with DR-6 of Contract NAS8-
39207, Advanced Transportation System Studies for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center. The report describes Rockwell International's cost
analysis results of Manned Launch Vehicle Concepts for Two Way
Transportation System Payloads to LEO during the Basic and Option 1
contract period of performance. This report is submitted as a
subsection of the Final Report (DR-4).
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1.0 SCOPE
1.1 Contract Tasks:
Advanced Transportation Systems Study (ATSS) Task Area 1 (TA1) costing
analysis task (SOW 5.3) consisted of three concurrent sub tasks which resulted in
the submission of two reports; the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and a WBS
Dictionary (DR-5), and the Program Cost Estimates Report (DR-6). The sub tasks
were as follows:
Sub task 3.1 Build Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and WBS Dictionary
Sub task 3.2 Develop Top-Level Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs)
Sub task 3.3 Estimate (manned) launch system cost elements
1.2 Launch Vehicle Concepts Costed During The Contract
Concepts which were examined in this study included the following launch
systems:
Space Shuttle
PLS with either the ALS-C6 or with the NLS-2 50 Klb booster
ESA's Ariane 5
CIS's Zenit (SL-16), Proton (SL-13) & Energia (SL-17)
NLS-2 50 Klb Launch Vehicle derivatives (Four derivatives evaluated)
Two-Stage Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) derived launch vehicle
(an F-1A booster stage with a J-2S second stage (S-IVB))
Cargo Transfer and Return Vehicle (CTRV)
1.3 Organization of DR-6 Report
For each of the individual launch vehicles (or group of concepts) costed during
this reporting period, this report contains a mini-report comprised of a unique
Section 1 (Approach, methodology & rationale),
Section 2 (Summary cost presentations),
Section 3 (Cost estimates by WBS element), and
Section 4 (Total program funding schedule)
as appropriate for that particular vehicle or concept. Each individual mini-
report details the groundrules & assumptions that were unique to that vehicle,
the cost estimating methodology used and its basis of estimate, and such cost
details as were estimated in each case (e.g., cost elements, cost drivers, cost
sensitivities, cost/performance tradeoffs, etc.)
2.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 Groundrules, Assumptions & Conventions
The structure for all cost estimates is reflected in the WBS (and accompanying
WBS Dictionary) which was agreed to among MSFC and the ATSS contractors (in
particular the TA4 contractor, General Dynamics). The WBS was submitted in
September, 1992 as a contract approved document (DR-5). Also agreed to
among the parties was a cost based on constant Fiscal Year 1993 Dollars. The
cost estimates reflect the system Cost To Government, including contractor fee,
government support & contingency. Adjustments for "New Ways of Doing
Business" were not credited unless specifically stated_ the CERs were thus based
on actual cost data.
2.2 Significant Issues:
The nature of TAI's costing task required us, on many of the systems examined
during this period, to synthesize individual cost estimates for one or more of the
elements (e.g., one study's estimate for a crew module, another study's estimate
for its launch vehicle) of an operational system. Frequently, those element-level
cost estimates had been prepared by other contractors, each working under its
own peculiar costing groundrules, assumptions and conventions. A non-trivial
portion of TAI's job, therefore, was to reconcile those estimates prepared by
"other" sources into a standard WBS that had been jointly agreed to by ATSS
contractors and MSFC/PP and that described the cost of a complete operational
system. Several significant issues, which limit the degree of cost comparability
between systems, arose during our attempts to reconcile and synthesize cost
estimates prepared by "other-than ATSS" sources:
Non-Comparable "Bases Of Estimates"
The "basis of estimate" underlying any one contractor's cost estimate was rarely
comparable to the basis of estimate for any other contractor's cost estimate.
Very few cost estimates were based on actual (historic) cost data from analogous
real programs, which would have provided the most credible basis of estimate.
Several "other study" estimates were contingent on third-party estimates. Not
infrequently, that third party happened to be the sponsor of another potential
new start system (e.g., the PLS's operational cost effectiveness relied heavily on
the ALS's $1,000 per pound to orbit C6 booster). Finally, some cost estimates
barely qualified for the term "cost estimate", but were simply stated as "targets"
or "goals". Compounding the non-comparability in bases of estimate, there
remains the question of discounting historic cost estimating relationships (CERs),
i.e., taking credits for "new ways of doing business", in the absence of any
compelling factual evidence that such a credit is warranted.
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Omission_ & Exclusions
The most pervasive source of non-comparability between cost estimates from
_---_ different programs and/or study contractors arose from the simple question:
"What's in" those numbers, and more importantly "What's not ?" Cost estimates
obtained from other programs were virtually never compatible in their overall
program content (e.g., number and type of design reference missions, overall
mission models and annual traffic rates, level of design maturity and technology
readiness levels). For example, several proponents of new launch systems (their
potential developer and/or operators) implicitly transferred substantial costs out
of the launch system and onto the end user. This is in effect an implicit
assumption that the mission sponsor would redesign his/her payload to
withstand higher accelerations during the ascent or that the payload could do
without such launch vehicle provided services as electrical power, cooling, data
processing, communications, etc. during launch processing, launch and ascent.
Others, either by assumption or groundrule, allocated functional requirements to
non-existent hardware that "would be available" from other programs (e.g.,
assumed that a space-resident orbital transfer vehicle would be there (free) to
transport cargo from its point of deployment to its final Space Station
destination). Cost estimates for some of the "next generation" launch vehicle
concepts appear to have been prepared as if the embodied technology were fully
matured for the application. That is, "known unknowns" (even "unknown
unknowns") were treated as "state of the art" without any corresponding
increments (appropriate risk adjustments) to expected cost.
Absorption _ versus Marginal Costing
There was, however, at least one area in which the groundrules and assumptions
used by sponsors of new launch systems was almost universally consistent --
that was in their treatment of infrastructure (standing army) costs. Virtually
without exception their groundrule was to let the Space Shuttle program pay for
maintaining the infrastructure (full absorption cost), but allow the new program
to obtain hardware at its marginal cost" (e.g., the next External Tank at $15M).
Not coincidentally, some concepts that relied on marginal costing for their
justification were intended to replace the Space Shuttle. Which program would
pick up the annual fixed infrastructure costs when the Shuttle was gone was
never addressed.
Costs of Mann_l Spaceflight
No sponsor of a new launch system (repeat, no sponsor of a new launch system)
addressed either the cost impact of man-rating their proposed launch vehicle or
the expected loss (cost of unreliability) associated with transporting crew into
space. Nor did any study fully acknowledge (accept) the extra costs associated
with NASA's manned spaceflight awareness criteria.
Unmanned Launch Vehicles
"no crew-unique subsystems
"accept demonstrated reliability
... insure against $ loss
* core ballistic trajectory
* limited (nil) on-orbit operations
an operations orientation I
Manned Launch Vehicles
crow-unique subsystems
... crew escape/safe haven provisions
... intact abort modes thru mission
... ECLSS, EVA, "cockpit"
Ill-defined man-rated criteria
... safe recovery, any credible emergency
... manned spaceflight awareness
•highest possible reliability"
extensive test & verification
inspection & documentation
recovery from orbit
... de-orbit, re-enb'y & landing systems
• hours/days of on-orbit operations
... fuel cells, waste management
... special "tools', e.g., RMS, EMU
... doors that open & close
... intense mission planning &control
I a perpetua/DDT&E environment ],=
Figure 2.3-1 Manned launch vehicle differences which drive costs.
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3.0 BASIC REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Space Shuttle
3.1.1 Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Methodology: Parametric
WB$ Level: Major Elements, e.g., External Tank, Orbiter, Launch & Landing
Primary Sources of Data:
$.lag_ To Saturn. NASA History Series SP-4206, Appendix D
_ZltalB, j._Analysis Of. the _ Shuttle System. F,xecutive summary..
NASW-2081
Assessment of S.P_aC_g,.Shuttle Program Cost F,,M.j212aift_n_Methods. ,
H. C. Mandell, Jr.
SgZa.cc_Shuttle -_c.LP.zflz.Cl_Operations Cost _ , June 1991
Groundr_ll¢_ & Assumptions
Development Cost actual Space Shuttle program costs
Funding Profile - actual Space Shuttle program funding profile
Operations & Support, Cost Per Flight - NASA's _ Operations Cost
Fiscal Year 1993 Dollars sources converted at OMB escalation rates
New Ways of Doing Business - not credited
Test Philosophy: as tested, consistent with Manned Spaceflight
Awareness
Operational Philosophy: operational , manned, partially-reusable
Management Approaches" institutionalized support
Original Development WBS
Orbiter
JSC Program Support
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Solid Rocket Booster
External Tank
MSFC Systems Management
Launch & Landing
NASA Headquarters
OMB Allowance
Summary of Co_t Trades" see Mathematics' "Justification" for Space Shuttle
5
it)
0
_iiiii!i
Q_v
Ira,w,
!iiiii!_
II II IN! II II II II | _! eI II 1I_ lIP1 II_ I|_ IIF4 IOfS II_
Figure 3.1-1 Saturn Launch Vehicles Cost over $50B '93
I structures,propulsion& enginesdrive hardware costI
Sit,urn V orbited 275,000 pounds into • 100 nm ¢imular od)it at in average cost of --$700M'93 per flight I
over 13 launches ... • lnmmoctatlon cost Of lust over $2.500"93 per pound I
Figure 3.1-2 75% of Saturn V cost per flight was for expendable hardware.
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Expendable Launch Vehicle
° continuous production run
... new components each flight
... continuous product improvement
... changes off-line at factory
... perpetual spares inventory
* no recovery systems
* 45 minute design life
* no "recover/refurbish" army
" LV is small fraction of stack value
... insurable stack
... precautions to protect payload
lower annual fixed cost, butrelatively hi_lher variable cost/flic/ht
Reusable Launch Vehicle
* limited (finite) production run
... "used" components each flight
... infrequent on-line "block changes"
... limited spares, cannibalization
recovery subsystems
... re-entry thermal protection
... wings, landing gear, parachutes
... avionics (GN&C) re-entry, landing
multiple use design life
army to recover & refurbish elements
" LV Is large fraction of stack value
... uninsurable stack
... precautions tO protect LV
I higher annual fixed cost, but Irelatively lower variable cost flight
Figure 3.1-3 Differences between expendable & reusable launch vehicles.
3.1.2 Summary Cost Presentations
Space Shuttle DDT&E Completed In Fiscal Year "82
11,000
°-_I
6,ooo
I $10.1B'RY
2,OOO
_¢ma- I,_?/ acltaW&W'7/ aclu_ IIM'RY
Figure 3.1-4 Space Shuttle DDT&E, Actual Costs vs. 1972 Estimates
actual escalate
Project $M'RY to $M'93
Orbiter 4,560.0 14,186
JSC 1,413.1 3,786
SSME 1,411.8 4,162
SRB 603.4 1,888
ET 628.0 1,778
MSFC 186.8 494
L.&L 1,059.4 2,590
HQ 198.8 732
Figure 3.1-5 Space Shuttle DDT&E Cost in FY93 Dollars
• comprehensive "bottoms-up" assessment of Space Shuttle operating costs
... determine resource requirements for flight rates from 1 to 10 per year
... directed by Space Shuttle Program Office and Office of Space Flight
... seventeen $10M+ project offices reviewed in detail (98% of operating costs)
... results presented to Dr. Lenoir, July 2, 1991
• groundrule: capability NOT maintained if not required to meet specific flight rate
... Orbiter Vehicles
... Mobile Launch Platforms
... Launch Pads & other (VAB cells, ET checkout cells, GSE)
• assumes continuing minimum production rates for specified elements
... External Tank (4 units per year)
... Solid Rocket Motor/Solid Rocket Booster (2 units per year)
... Space Shuttle Main Engine (3 flights per year)
... astronaut corps (40 astronauts)
Figure 3.1-6 NASA's Zero-Base Operations Cost Study,
message: it costs nearly $2B to fly it once s year,
every flight after Me first one is a bargain
1 3 = 4 s d, 7 I 9 10
,be_&,_wm win.y_r
July 1991
O q,.i, I
O vm.w,a., I
li I
B_mh_ I
O.
Figure 3.1-7 Shuttle Annual Cost is Dominated by Fixed Support Costs
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Figure 3.1-8 Shuttle Average Cost per Flight Drops as Flight Rate Rises
mlmll
w_ flights #8, 119, & #10 (& subsequent ?) per year average -$105M'93 each
2oo
1°° ilib
! 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 IO
increment Space Shuffle flight rate to flights per year
Figure 3.1-9 Shuttle Variable Cost per Flight (Marginal cost of next flight)
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3.1.3 Cost Estimates by WBS Element
Element Rxod Corn Variable C,'-t SEE
Per Yw lM'93 Per Righ! SM'g3 $M'93 P2
ET 339.1 12.0 12.0 0.gl
SRB/RSRM 317.4 32.0 11.7 0.99
Orbiter & GFE 1289 7.7 4.2 0.g7
SSME 76,2 8.1 3.2 0.g7
Launch & landing 250.3 45.8 27.3 0.97
Logistics 98.1 10.1 4.0 0.98
Mission Op$ 227,2 9.4 2.7 0.9g
SSPO 122.7 6.0 2.4 0.98
other 160.9 8.4 4.3 0.98
Space Shuttle 1,720.2 137.t 48.0 0.99
3.1.4
Figure 3.1-10 Space Shuttle Element Cost per Flight ($M93)
Total Program Funding Schedules
IM
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40O
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Figure 23.1-11 Space Shuttle Element Funding Profile (real-year SM)
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3.2 Personnel Launch System (PLS) with the Advanced Launch
System (ALS-C6) and the National Launch System (NLS-2)
Boosters
3.2.1 Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Methodology
Element level cost estimates for PLS/ALS/NLS were not generated by TA1. For
each individual element, cost estimates had previously been generated by study
contractors, and these were used by TA1 as they had been documented in each
study's final report. Apparent deficiencies (e.g.., unrealistic groundrules,
inconsistent program content, incredible cost per flight or dollar per pound
quotes, etc.) in the source cost estimates were noted, but were not corrected by
TA1. Each study's cost estimate was re-aligned into the approved ATSS WBS,
was escalated to constant FY 1993 dollars, and was combined with the other
elements to constitute an estimate for the operational system. NASA "wraps" for
contractor fee, government support and contingency were added.
Primary Sources of Data:
NAS1-18975 Personnel Launch System Advanced Manned Launch System Life
Cycle Cost Analysis. , DRD-7, September 10, 1990
Groundrules & A_sumptions
The source cost estimates were escalated to Government Fiscal Year 1993
Dollars. The source specifically excludes cost of man-rating the booster and of
facilitizing ALS for PLS. The source uses ALS-C6 @ $43.3M ('89) per launch
based on USAF/SD quote. The source assumes "airline operations" resulting in a
peak operations staffing of less than 1,000 EP.
Test Philosophy: 4 to 6 PLS test flights prior to initial operational
capability
Operational Philosophy: "airline operations"
Cost Avoidance Techniques: numerous, e.g., fecal bags in lieu of "potty"
Managemen_ Approaches high tolerance for risk, e.g., fabricating large
graphite polyimide structures
Representative CERs: see Section 3.2.3
Cost Factors: excludes necessary costs, e.g., development test
facilities for water landing tests
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3.2.2 Summary Cost Presentations
I source data: NAS1.18975 Personnel Launcl_ System Advanced Manned I
Launch System, Life Cycle Cost Ana_sls DRD 7, SepterrC_r 10, 1990 !
• Program consists of:.
... PLS facilities
4 Personnel Launch Vehicles (PLVs), total 8 flights per yearo..
141 expendable PLS/ALS adapters with launch escape
• Source cost data based on DRM-1 only (t_are.bones SSF crew rotaUon)
• Source assumes Advanced Launch System (ALS) operational capability
... ALS developed Independent of (at no cost to) PLS
... ALS C-6 available for orbital flight test of PLS glider
... PLS uses ALS O -$52.1M'93 per flight (input from USAF/SSD)
• Source makes no provision for man-rating launch vehicle
• Source assumes "aidine operations" of PLS/ALS
Figure 3.2-1 Personnel launch System (PLS) Cost Estimates
I Assumes ALS development prior to and independent of PLS
No prov_ions were made for man-ratin_l launch vehicle
• _or, E
1 2 $ 4 | II T II ii to it t2
NOTE: PLS adapter pmduclion trmt_l h_n u an ,aemenl of moJmng Cost Per Right
Figure 3.2-2 DDT&E and CoF for PLS Spacecraft, $6.0B'93
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I ALS C-6 _t per launch (-$44M'$9) data ti_fo input Io PLS/AMLS by USAF I
pLS Aequ_m_ 4 _ . ALS Lam_ Co_L f_r e3
md'M
1,400
t,aO0
1.000
I00
4OO
200
0
1 3 S )' 9 11 13 16 17 19 21 . 23 25 27 29 31
y_m miler PI.S p_Gplm "9o-ai_ecl"
Figure 3.2-3 Advanced Launch System (ALS) was Baseline Booster for PLS
$M'9_)
t_ yN,r
s,a_o
1,400
1.200
1,000
It(X)
nO0
4OO
0
tm.ttw*4..S
• Pt.V 2.3.4
DDT&E
IIC.,_
1 2 3 4 § 6 7 | 0 10 11 12
t_ed-.tq.s'tle*4m*t
I Assurnes NLS development prior to and independent of PLS iNo provisions for men-ratin_l launch vet_lole have been made t
Figure 3.2-4 Use of NLS Booster Increases PLS DDT&E to $7.3B
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PLS baseline mission model averages 8 flights per year
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Figure 3.2-5 NLS-2 Booster Costs Dominate PLS Cost per Flight
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3.2.3 Cost Estimates by WBS Element
Cost Estimates for Personnel Launch System (PLS_ Element
Acquisition Cost
Non-Recurring CoF
Non-Recurring DDT&E
Recurring Production (PLS #2,#3 & #4)
Recurring Cost Per Flight
$ 6,862 (M'93)
487
5,480
895
$101 M'93 per year
+ $10 M'93 per flight
Cost Estimates for Advanced Launch System (ALS_ Element (source USAF/SD_
Acquisition Cost:
Recurring Cost Per Flight
estimate not provided by USAF/SD
$ 42 (M'93) per year
+ $ 47 (M'93) per flight
NOTE: costs to man-rate ALS-C6 and to facilitize ALS for PLS manned operations
are not included
Cost Estimates: National Launch System (NLS) Element (source NLS Cost
Status, January 15, 1992)
Acquisition Cost
Non-Recurring CoF
Non-Recurring DDT&E
Recurring Production:
Recurring Cost Per Flight:
$ 5,896 (M'91, per NLS convention)
341
5,555
included in recurring cost per flight
$315 (M'93) per year
+ $107 (M'93) per flight
NOTE: Costs to man-rate the NLS-2 50Klb launch vehicle and to facilitize the NLS
launch site for manned PLS operations are not included. It is assumed that the
Space Shuttle program absorbs annual fixed costs associated with External Tank
production. A "credit" for "new ways of doing business" (NWODB) was also
assumed.
3.2.4 Total Program Funding Schedules
See Section 3.2.2
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3.3 ESA's Ariane 5 and the CIS's Zenit (SL-16), Proton (SL-13) &
Energia (SL-17) Boosters
At the direction of NASA/HQ, NASA/JSC's Manned Transportation System (MTS)
study was evaluating foreign launch systems for potential use in America's
manned-space program. In mid-July of 1992, MTS asked NASA/MSFC's
Advanced Transportation Systems Study (ATSS) Task Area 1 (TAI) contractor to
provide technical data, including cost estimates, for the European Space Agency's
(ESA's) Ariane 5 and the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS's) Soyuz,
Proton and Energia launch vehicles.
3.3.1 Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Methodology
Rough-Order-of-Magnitude (ROM) parametric estimates of non recurring (NR)
development costs for ESA's Ariane 5 and estimates of operational cost per flight
(CPF) for Ariane 5, Soyuz, Proton and Energia are summarized in Table 1, below.
Cost estimates are dimensioned in millions of fiscal year 1992 US dollars
($FY'92M) at mid-1992 currency exchange rates and assume a circa-1998 launch
date. Generally, estimates were made at the launch vehicle-level (rather than
element subsystem-level) consistent with degree of vehicle technical definition
available.
Primary sources of data:
1) International Reference Guide To Space Launch Systems, S. J.. Isakowitz,
AIAA, 1991,
2) Aviation Week & Space Technology, (various articles)
3) Soviet Year in Space, N. Johnson, Teledyne Brown Engineering
4) Anecdotal information regarding conditions in CIS's space industry as of July
'92 provided through the U.S. Department of Commerce.
These foreign launchers have been priced/costed at their commercial equivalent
value, i.e., at their replacement costs assuming an on-going business. As a result,
particularly for CIS's Soyuz, Proton and Energia, these cost estimates are
substantially higher than the "bargain" rates quoted in mid-1992 by Glavcosmos.
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Cost Estimates Do Nor Include
... extra costs to I_Tm launch vehicle
... extra costs to operate In Manned Spaceflight Awareness environment
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM), parametric CER (SEE -4- 20%)
.. estimates In conatsnt-yesr 1992 US$, commercial equivalent launch, circe 1998
... Arlene $ development (DDT&E)
.. Arlene $, Proton & Energla cost per flight
Consistent With I.m, el of Design Definition
.. launch vehicle
... payload capability (maximum) st launch site latitude
... gross lift-off weight
... stage level data Incomplete, Inconsistent
Foreign Currency Exchange Rates
Primary Sources of Data
... International Reference Guide To Space Launch Systems, AIAA
... Soviet Yesr ln Spac& TRW
... Aviation Week & Space Technology
... anecdotal, US DoC
Figure 3.3-1 Groundrules & Assumptions for Foreign Launch Vehicle Costs
CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO FOREIGN VEHICLES
.* MethodologyData Base Umitations
Exchange Rates
Foreign Productivity (man-year equivalent)
* ONL Y SOYUZ Has Actually Launched Crew
European Space Agency (ESA) & Arlene
• Commercial Operations
Exchange Rates
Hermes De-Soaped (unmanned X2000)
* Arlane 5 Man-Rating ?
Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) & Soyuz, Proton & Energia
• Political Stability
* Launch Rates
* Free-Market Economics (labor/factor mobility)
** Productivity
Exchange Rates
Figure 3.3-2 Unique Considerations For Foreign Launch Vehicle Costs
18
Estimates are dimensioned in $FY'92M at mid-1992 foreign currency exchange
rates. Estimates for ESA's Ariane program were originally developed in ESA
"accounting units" and translated to US dollars at average 1990-1991 exchange
rates between French francs, German D-marks and Italian lira to neutralize the
effects of exchange rate fluctuations (i.e., currency risks between dollars and
"accounting units"). These average $FY'90-$FY'91 were subsequently converted
to $FY'92. The problem of converting historical CIS costs, dimensioned in rubles,
to $FY'92 was more profound. The existence of different types of rubles
(domestic and international), coupled with extremely volatile exchange rates
today resulting from rampant inflation within CIS make direct conversion of
ruble-based costs to dollar-based costs an exercise in futility. Therefore,
estimates for CIS's launch vehicles were developed using a free-market man-
year equivalent basis which assumes that input factors (particularly labor) to
CIS's space industry were (are) exactly as productive as European and American
aerospace workers were (are). Given that assumption, CIS hardware and
services can be valued at free-market costs.
Launchers were costed at commercial equivalent values assuming circa-1998
launch While CIS may, in the very short-term, be willing to price its launch
services below replacement costs (e.g., Glavcosmos has recently offered Proton
launches for $56M) to obtain hard currency, it cannot afford to do so in the long
run. If CIS continues its move toward free-market economics, its input costs (for
materials, labor and capital) will rise sharply and that, in turn, will force its
offering prices to rise.
Vehicle specific technical descriptions were used as stated in references.
Although minor errors and inconsistencies were found in some technical
descriptions (e.g., stage weights), they were ignored in favor of data
comparability across vehicles. No attempt was made to "normalize" stated
performance capabilities to a standard orbital inclination (e.g., Proton capability
was taken at Baikonur, with no decrement for plane change to a standardized
28.5 degrees inclination; nor was any increment given for enhanced Proton
capability if it were launched from Cape York).
For existing commercial ELVs, Cost Per Flight (CPF) quotes were used as stated.
CPF estimates were not reconciled against other (contradictory) sources.
Commercial Titan launches have been quoted as low as $111.5M and $108.4M
(AW&ST 16 July 90, p24), compared to $130M-$150M without an upper stage as
cited by Isakowitz. Element-level data for foreign launchers has been found to
be very inconsistent. For example, the sum of the Ariane 5 P230 solid rocket
motor costs and the HM-60 cryogenic engine costs totaled more than entire
lower composite for the Ariane 5 launcher.
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Extra man-rating" and manned operations costs were not estimated. The
suitability of some foreign launchers for manned space flight is highly suspect.
While CIS's Atlas-class Soyuz (SL-4) has routinely transported crew capsules and
Salyut/Mir space station provisions into space from Baikonur since 1963, it is
the only one of these launch vehicles to have actually demonstrated its manned
space flight capability. CIS's Titan class Proton (SL-13) boosted seven Salyut-
series space stations into low-Earth-orbit (LEO) between 1971 and 1985 and
lofted the Mir space station in 1986, but has not been used for manned space
flight nor are there known plans to "man-rate" the vehicle. CIS's Saturn V-class
Energia (SL-17) has boosted the Buran space shuttle orbiter into LEO, but has
flown only twice (both unmanned missions) and is in jeopardy of cancellation for
lack of payloads. ESA's Titan-class Ariane 5, under development as a man-rated
vehicle to support ESA's Hermes in addition to its primary role as a commercial
launcher, is at least three years away from first flight and is vulnerable to
capability change.
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Figume I. Ouotes for CIS Launch Vehicles Are Systematically Lover Than ESA & US Prfces
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Figure 3.3-3 Quotes for CIS Boosters Lower Than ESA and USA Boosters
Figure 2. CtS°mLaunch Vehicle Hardware Is Not Ctearty Sqpe_r To Either ESA 's Or US'B
o
Figure 3.3-4
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CIS Boosters are not Superior to ESA and USA Boosters
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Commercial ELV Prices Tightly Correlated with LEO Performance
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Figure 5. Competltlon Ensures That CIS Costs (& Pr_ ?) Will Climb Tow_r_ Market Levels
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Figure 3.3-7 Competition will Force CIS Costs to Climb to Market Levels
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Specific SL-13 (D-1) Proton Groundrules
• 3-stage SL-13 (19-1) launch circa 1998
* political stability (no counter-revolution)
* continued movement toward free market
* labor ($1 O,000 per man-year) mobility
* exchange @ 150 to 200 rubles per dollar
* 10 to 13 launches peryear, SL-13 & SL-12
Operational since 1970
... SL-13 (D-1) three-stage LEO
... SL- 12 (D- l-e) four-stage GEO
... 187 cumulative launches through "90
... 2 operational Baikonur (Tyuratam) pads
Cost Per Flight $M'92 $140
launch vehicle 126
operations 14
Cost Per Flight estimate based on
groSS lift.off weight & payioad aapabilily
N_I'@OBIPARIdILE TO NLb4MIED EIIfIIMTE8
Figure 3.3-8 CIS SL-13 Proton Launch Vehicle
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Specific SL- 17 Energia Groundrules
" baseline SL- 17 w 4 strap-on boosters
" annual fight rate ... 1
* assume program not cancelled
* only flown twice, once with Buran
• * does not include Buran or crew ops
4 _r=pon | Development: reported to have cost I
• z,_ 10 to 15 billion rubles over 15years I
• Ist stage
RD.170
IIl_ • Cost Per Flight $M'92 . $ 516
IIIIl_ launch vehicle 413
_ operations 103
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Figure 3.3-9 CIS Energia Launch Vehicle
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Specific Afiane 5 Groundrules
* commercial launch circa 1998
* "90-'91 average exchange rates
* 50-70 unit production lot buy
° ESA productivity ... capitalAabor split
* annual fight rate ... 8 to 12
* profit (loss) Incentives
Development Cost $M'92 $ 5,412
DDT&E 4,326
N/R Production 347
Construction of Facilities 739
Cost Per Flight $M'92 $ 90
launch vehicle 66
operations 6
profit (support) 6
reserves & other direct costs 12
Cost Per Flight estimate based on
gross M-off weigllr, payload ca_ibility & Other dmta sources
NOT'OOMPARABLETONLS-BAIIEDJnlTIWATEB
Figure 3.3-10 ESA Ariane V Launch Vehicle
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3.3.3 Cost Estimates by WBS Element
ESA's commercial Ariane 5 is currently a developmental system, with an
expected initial operational capability (IOC) in 1995. CIS's Soyuz (IOC 1963),
Proton (IOC 1968) and Energia (IOC 1987) are currently operational launch
systems, and no further development efforts are anticipated.
Summary_ of Cost Estimates for Ariane 5. Soyuz. Proton & Enereia
Non-Recurring Cost
$FY'92M (1)
Cost Per Flight (3)
$FY'92M (1)
Ariane 5
Soyuz
Proton
Energia
$ 5,400
not applicable (2)
not applicable (2)
not applicable (2)
$ 90@ 10 per year
$ 52@ 40 per year
$ 140@ 13 per year
$ 51@ 1 per year
Note_;
(1) Assumes an average $FY'92M exchange at approximately 150 CIS rubles per
US dollar and 0.8 ESA accounting units per US dollar
(2) Soyuz (IOC 1963), Proton (IOC 1968) and Energia (IOC 1987) are already
operational; no further non-recurring are costs anticipated
(3) Cost per flight estimates assume a circa-1998 commercial launch from
Kourou (ESA) or Baikonur (CIS)
3.3.4 not applicable
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3.4
3.4.1
Methodolo_,v"
National Launch System (NLS)-Derived
Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Parametric
Primary S0ur_ 9f Data:
Launch Vehicles
design-to-cost "goals " per F. D. Bachtel
Groundrules & Assumotions
All costs expressed in $M 1991 (NLS convention) and are based on cost "goals",
do not reconcile with cost "estimates"
New Ways of Doing Business: assumed a cost reduction "credit" for NWODB
unknown
operated by "airman 2nd"s & "tech sergeants" ...
profuse
Test Philosophy:
Operational Philosophy:
Number/Kind_ of Spares:
CQ_t Avoid_n¢_ Techniques: marginal costing
Management Approaches" high risk tolerance, e.g., new, low-cost STME
development concurrent with launch vehicle DDT&E
pictorial
cost factors Summary of Cost Trades
Summary Cost Presentations
WBS DefinitiQn:
Repre_¢nt_ltive CERs:
3.4.2
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Figure 3.4-1 NLS Costs Not Comparable To Foreign Booster Estimates
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Figure 3.4-2 NLS-2 (6/2) Baseline Recurring Cost Breakdown
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Figure 3.4-4 Facility Requirements & Operational Complexities Were Compared
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Figure 3.4-5 NLS-2 and Derivative Boosters Complexity Assessment
Figure 3.4-6 NLS-2 (6/2) (Engine Out) Compared To NLS-2 4/1 (No Engine Out)
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hardware complexily 0.82 1.16 1.27
operationscomplexity 0.95 1.18 1.48
hardware % 58 82 90
operations% 18 22 28
reserves % 8 12 13
relative % 8--'5 11_ 13_
m
1.00
1.00
71
19
10
100
$100M CPF
Figure 3.4-12 NLS Derived Booster Costs Based on $100M Cost Per Flight Goal
3.4.3 Cost Estimates by WBS Element
None provided.
3.4.4 Total Program Funding Schedules
None provided.
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3.5 Two-Stage Launch Vehicle: LOX/RP F-IA Booster & LOX/LH2
J-2S Second Stage (S-IVB)
3.5.1 Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Estimates for non-recurring design, development, test & evaluation (DDT&E) cost,
theoretical first unit (TFU) cost, and cost per flight at the 25th unit were made
for a two stage launch vehicle comprised of a booster (first) stage based on
Martin Marietta's (MMC's) Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) concept, an upper
(second) stage based on McDonnell Douglas' (MDD's) S-IVB stage for Saturn I-B
and Saturn V, and an avionics/interstage equivalent to Boeing's (BA's)
instrument unit for Saturn V.
Parametric rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) estimates were based on available
(sketchy and sometimes internally inconsistent) weight data for all stages, using
analogies to historic actual costs and/or available subsystem-level cost
estimating relationships (CERs). Given the aforementioned limitations, only
moderate confidence (perhaps within 25% or so) should be ascribed to the
estimates.
3.5.2 Summary Cost Presentations
None made
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3.5.3 Cost Estimates by WBS Element
WBS Cost Element
Construction of Facilities
Launch Vehicle
Launch Operations
Mission (Flight) Operations
Indirect Wraps
Contractor's fee
Program Support
Vehicle Integration (prime)
Contingency
Launch System Software
Launch Vehicle
Instrument Unit
Stage 2 (S-IVB)
Stage 1 Booster
(Ibm) M'93
419
TFU 25th
M'93 M'93
1,425,921 4,807 359 244
39 26
15 10
2,021 75
370 27
740 13
176 13
587 23
149
51
Hardware 159,381 2,786 230 156
115
31,571
123,310
Comment: This concept achieves its relatively superior performance (payload to
low Earth orbit is roughly 4% of gross lift-off weight, which is unusually high for
a 1,425,000 pound "stack") largely as a result of its extremely costly
(performance optimized) S-IVB second stage. If this concept is pursued any
further, upper stage cost versus upper stage performance should become a
primary tradeoff.
3.5.4 Total Program Funding Schedule
Not estimated
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3.6 Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle (CTRV)
3.6.1 Costing Approach, Methodology & Rationale
Cost estimates were not provided by the ATSS contractor for the several CTRV
concepts examined during the study. Development and operational cost
estimates for the CTRV concepts were provided by NASA as part of the Access to
Space (Option 2) study. The ATSS study did provide cost estimating factors and
CTRV design information to NASA for use in their cost estimating activities. A
Design Complexity factor and a Percent New Design factor were defined for the
CTRV cost estimates. These factors were used by all NASA centers to provide a
common cost estimating basis for the many CTRV concepts under study. Weight
estimates were provided to NASA for those CTRV concepts which the ATSS
contract designed (see ATSS Final Report (DR-4) for CTRV weight data provided
in support of cost estimates).
Design Complexity
This cost factor compares the functional requirements and performance
specifications that have been imposed on the hardware/software item to be
costed to items which comprise the cost estimating database. The factor assumes
that added functions and/or higher performance manifest themselves in the
forms of compound or complex geometry, larger physical dimensions, exotic
materials, higher parts count, increased level of redundancy, more extensive test
& verification programs, etc.
Factor
>1.0
Dsfinition of Desi_,n Comnlexitv Factor_
hardware/software required to provide more functions or meet
higher performance specifications than items included as basis
of estimate
1.00 hardware/software which performs essentially identical
functions and meets essentially identical performance
specifications as items included as basis of estimate
< 1.00 hardware/software required to provide fewer functions or
meet lower performance specifications than items included as
basis of estimate
Percent New Design
This factor describes the level of competence and/or experience which exists in
designing, developing, testing, and evaluating (DDT&E) the hardware or software
item.
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Factor
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
Definition of % New Desi_,n Factor
Analogous hardware components or software items do not
exist. No relevant DDT&E experience. Unproven technology
(TRL 4 or 5).
Analogous hardware components or software items do exist but
were developed by others. No direct DDT&E experience, but
the technology can be acquired (literature or personnel).
Immature technology (TRL 5 or 6), technology readiness
demonstrations are required.
Very limited DDT&E experience with similar items exists. Some
new technology implemented in the design (TRL 6 or 7).
Considerable DDT&E experience with very similar (function)
items exists. Major modifications (scale or application) of
existing hardware/software is required. Mature technology,
materials and processes are well understood.
Extensive DDT&E experience with essentially identical items
exists. Minor modifications (scale or application) of existing
hardware/software is required. Mature technology, materials
and processes are well understood.
"As-is" hardware or software used in identical application and
environment.
An example of the use of the Design Complexity and Percent New Design factors
are shown for the Winged CTRV concept. NASA used these factors with the
CTRV weight estimates for estimating CTRV system costs. The mathematical
combination of these factors (straight multiplication, sum of the squares, etc.)
may be varied by the cost analyst to best match cost estimating relationships
(CERs) for the system being costed and the reference cost database.
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Wlnged CTRV
Subsystem/Component
Thermal ProtecUon System
no. cone (ACC)
tiles (HRSI or LRSI)
blankets (TABI or AFRSl)
misc. (seals, heal sinks,...)
Thermal Control System
radiators
boilers
plumbing, valves, etc.
insulation
Orbital Maneuvering System
thrusters
tanks (MMH + NTO)
plumbing, valves, etc.
Attitude Control System
FWD - thrusters
- tanks (He)
- plumbing, etc.
AFT - thrusters
- tanks (MMH + NTO)
I - plumbing, etc.
;Electrical Power Generation
batteries
fuel cells
fuel cell re=__ant storage
plumbing, valves, etc.
Electrical Power Dlstrlb
_ower distdb/controllers
wire harne_g=_¢ ¢
Avionics Systems
GN&C
Comm & tracking
Data proces__!ng
Instrumentation
Rendezvous r_lar
Environmental Control
purge ducts
vent doors
Landing Systems
landing gear
actuators/mechanisms
;tructurss
Fwd fuselage
Mid fuselage
Aft fuselage
Payload bay doors
Door hinges/latches
Wings
CTRV Dry Weight
Consumables
Payload
CTRV Launch Welqht
Totsl Weight
(Ibs)
8rg17
11281
6T782
596
259
lv848
857
691
Percent New
Design
Design
Complexity
0.30 1.0C
0.30 1.0C
0.20 1.0C
0.10 1.00i
0.20
0.20
1.00
1.00
230 0.40 1.00
690 0,10 1.00
11493
40
1,156
297
345
127
58
0.40'
0.40
0.40
1.00
127
35
21156
242
1.00
1.00
1.000.40
0.40 1.00
0.40 1.00
0.10 1.00
0.40 1.00
0.40 1.00
0.40 1.00
567 0.20 1.00
959 0.20 1.0C
368 0.40 1.0C
Iw909
230
1t67g
lv2241
846
0.60 1.2C
0.40 1.0(:
0.60 1.0(
0.401378 1.0C
0 0.40 1.2(
"0 0.40 1.2(
0 0.20 1.0(
704
106 0.20 1.0{
598 0.20
41784
1.0(
3,588 0.40 1.0(
1,196 0.60 1.0_
20r150
4,500 0.60 1.0k
4,670 0.20 1.0_
0.60 1.013T190
2,770 0.10 1.01
1,130 0.10 1.0i
0.60 1.0,3Tsg0
43,$27
111763
42,S00
971790
Figure 3.6-1 Winged CTRV Cost Estimating Factors
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3.6.2 Summary Cost Presentations
None prepared.
Cost Estimates by WBS Element3.6.3
None made
3.6.4 Total Program Funding Schedule
Not estimated
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